










The present paper discusses the radical changes witnessed in the political landscape of the 
world today. After 25 years of post-Cold World hopes for triumph of liberal democracy, the 
years between 2014 and 2016 shattered the Western World. The annexation of Crimea by 
Putin’s Russia came first in March 2014, then in June 2016, the Berxit of Boris Johnson 
followed and finally in November 1916, came the stunning victory of Donald Trump at the 
US presidential elections. These developments can be called the illiberal turn in politics and 
ideology.  
 In fact, this was not the first time that a conservative wave started rolling from the East. 
The Ayatollah’s Islamic revolution in Iran in 1978–9 was a harbinger of Margaret Thatcher’s 
installation as Prime Minister of UK in 1979 and of Ronald Reagan’s coming to power as the 
president of the USA in 1981. 
 
2. The Cold War and its Lasting Implications 
The main thesis of this essay is that the illiberal turn in 2014–16 disproved the simplistic 
view that the end of the Cold War would change the world forever by solving all global 
political problems caused by the “empire of Evil”, the Soviet Union, and that the fall of the 
Berlin Wall marked the end of that history (Fukuyama 1992). On the contrary, I see the 
historical asset of the Cold War as constitutive of the political map of the Western World 
today. Apparently, “the legacies of previous political regimes—both positive and negative—
weigh heavily on the development of new ones” (Berman 2019: 302).
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 Take for example Putin’s Russia. Her aggressive politics against “the West” is just a 
further development of the tradition of confrontation from the Cold War. The main objective 
of Putin’s political agenda is to restore the power and influence of Russia in the world as in 
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the 1950s and 1960s. The government-led media ceaselessly try to influence the masses in 
this country to the effect that “the West” is an evil “partner” the aim of which is to destroy 
Russia and subjugate her people.  
 One reason for this development is that the desired objective, which was adopted 30 
years ago, of creating a political system of liberal democracy in the post-communist world, 
was a rather difficult undertaking. Securing its basics—individual liberties, rule of law, and 
minority rights—is not an easy task to achieve. It requires a strong state, well-formed 
national identity and a developed political culture. In fact, this is a challenge not only for the 
East European countries in the post-Cold War era, but also for some South European states 
like Italy and Greece. 
 
3. The Aftermath of Cold War in Eastern Europe 
This predicament is confirmed through the developments in Eastern Europe in the last 15 
years where many started to believe that democratic liberalism was “the light that failed” 
(Krastev and Holmes 2019). The intellectuals of these countries lament today that after the 
fall of the Berlin Wall they were urged to imitate and copy the values, the institutions and 
social and political practices of the liberal democracies of the West. These were 
recommended as a kind of orthodoxy and dogma. The copy, however, is in principle inferior 
in quality to the original. This allegedly explains why some politicians in Eastern Europe 
turned back to authoritarian illiberalism, populist xenophobia and reactionary nativism. They 
fight multiculturalism, cosmopolitanism, and individualism, and hold that in their countries 
there are national traditions that work better than the dogma of liberal democracy. 
 My answer to these arguments is, first, that liberal democracy does not consist of dogmas 
and orthodoxy. It is an approach that changes in the context of time and place. Liberal 
democracy recurrently renews itself.
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 Secondly, this position is mistaken for philosophical 
reasons. In his Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein has shown that people learn social 
practices, for example, speaking language, in an ultimate form, so that at the end of the day 
the copy is not inferior to the original. The persons that learn a language from a teacher 
master it in a way that is not inferior to the way that the teacher has it. In fact, political 
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 See § 6 below for details. 
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4. USA and the Aftermath of the Cold War 
The developments in the USA in the last 30 years also follow the direction outlined by the 
Cold War. In his novel Rabbit at Rest, John Updike posed the question (in the words of his 
fictional character Harry Angstrom): “Without the Cold War, what’s the point of being an 
American?” (1990: 367). Apparently, for the political class in that country, there was no other 
point. In consequence, when the Cold War ended, the political elite in the USA replaced it 
with another kind of radical antagonism—the enmity between the two leading parties of this 
country. This led to political tribalism. Today, the animosity between the Democratic Party 
and the GOP seems to be a matter of necessity, the subject of disagreement being of lesser 
importance.
4
 One of its most mischievous appearances was republican Newt Gingrich’s 
“guerilla warfare” against the democratic House of Representatives in the 1990s, which 
culminated in the impeachment trial of Bill Clinton in 1998, also engineered by Gingrich. 
 In fact, this radical polarization of the Western society started with Ronald Reagan’s and 
Margaret Thatcher’s conservative revolution in the mid-1970s. In terms of political 
philosophy, they put accent on the negative and not on the positive liberties, understood as a 
self-mastery of the autonomous personality (Berlin 1958). As a result, Reagan and Thatcher 
set up the era of turbo, or casino capitalism. This politics led to significant erosion of the 
middle class and to the creation of the class of hyper-rich. Ironically, Donald Trump, the 
defender of reducing taxation of the rich, but also master of publicity, used this reality to 
support his populist agenda.  
 Importanly, the triumph of “Reaganomics” in the 1980s coincided with the downfall of 
the Soviet Bloc socialism. An illusion perpetuated that the remedy for the economic and 
political failures of the East European countries is to follow Milton Friedman’s dogma of 
unlimited free market. The results were often dissatisfactory which partly explains the 
disappointment of the East Europeans with liberal democracy. This is supported by the fact 
that first signs of the illiberal turn in Eastern Europe appeared exactly after the financial crisis 
of 2007/8. 
 Unfortunately, when the Soviet Bloc and the Soviet Union collapsed in 1989–91, the 
USA politicians understood it as a win in the Cold War. They did not, therefore, consider 
changing the political course but continued the politics they had pursued for decades 
(Bacevich 2020). America was intoxicated with its success. The implication was pursuing the 
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policy of unbounded capitalism paralleled by unbounded individualism. The result was 
tearing apart the social fabric. 
 In foreign policy, the implication of this development was that the one and only 
remaining superpower, the USA, started to dictate the terms of peace, taking over the global 
leadership. In the context of this ideology, G. W. Bush and Dick Cheney tried to forcefully 
extend liberal democracy to the Islamic world. The result was the Second Golf War (2003–
2011) that displaced Saddam Hussein as president of Iraq. Practically the same policy was 
pursued in the early 2010s, when an effort was made to liberalize the Arab countries. It 
started at the Tahir Square in Cairo, went through Algeria and ended with the civil war in 
Libya and Syria that still goes on.  
 The unsuccessful attempt of the USA to export liberal democracy to the Middle East 
decisively contributed to Putin’s confrontation with the West. It began in 2007 as Putin tried 
to debilitate the only superpower, USA, by seeking to establish a multipolar world. Putin’s 
leading idea was not an argument stemming from the moral or political philosophy, but to 
fight against the political and military hegemony of the USA. 
 
5. The Role of the Mass Media Revolution 
An important factor in the illiberal turn of events in 2014–16 was the revolution of the mass 
media which has been going on for nearly a decade now. It made the multiplication of fake 
news ubiquitous and facilitated the propagation of conspiracy theories and anecdotes of 
dubious quality and provenance. The champions of illiberalism tirelessly spread the belief 
that in the realm of politics “anything goes”. There is no right and wrong and, above all, no 
truth. 
In order to better understand this development, it may be recalled that the printing of 
books in 1455 (the year the “Gutenberg Bible” was first published) brought about a 
revolution in the mass media of similar dimension. It led to the Reformation of the Catholic 
Christianity started by Martin Luther in 1517. Arguably, the online revolution of the mass 
media in the 2010s changed the world both ideologically and politically in a similar way. 
Fake news, alternative facts, and the crisis of the truth are the results.  
 
6. Philosophical Defense of Liberal Democracy 
The main objective of the present paper is, however, not to reveal only the causes of the 




democracy. The latter is to be confused neither with turbo capitalism nor with 
multiculturalism. The principles of liberal democracy are well grounded in philosophical 
analyses made over the centuries by John Locke, David Hume, Rousseau, Kant and Hannah 
Arendt, among others. Of course, their works are not canonical. We also know from 
Horkheimer and Adorno (1944) that the Age of Enlightenment had its dark side too. Be that 
as it may, the past masters of political philosophy can greatly help to create a clearer concept 
of liberal democracy today. It is a political understanding based on values that are proven 
over the ages. As I see it, liberal democracy is not a theory but a method, an approach. It is 
prone to changing its ways when confronted with new situations. Because of this, its mastery 
and implementation is not an easy task. It needs recurrent corrections and modifications.  
 One of the implications of the developments, described in § 4 above, is that today the 
USA cannot be considered anymore the “strongest democracy”. An alternative savior and 
protector of liberal democracy today is Germany. An important factor in this development is 
the reductio ad absurdum of nationalism—the propeller of the Great War and its second 
installment, the Second World War—in this country. Being fundamentally anti-nationalistic, 
Germany today is oriented to the future and not to its past—it is a radically progressivist 
country. Its Constitution is based on reason, while the Constitution of the USA is based on 
the authority of the Founding Fathers. Moreover, its politics is led by consensus, not by 
animus; its politics is not polemic. In the USA, in contrast, politics is often understood in 
terms of war and enmity (French 2020). Party coalitions are typical in Germany, something 
difficult in UK and practically unthinkable in the USA.  
 As a matter of fact, politics of social balancing and compensation was typical for 
Germany of the fin de siècle era. Well-known are Bismarck’s social laws and Gustav 
Schmoller’s political economy of social market. The political class of the time strived to 
achieve culture in society as measured by progress on the moral front. Unfortunately, 
German’s concept of liberal democracy has also its problems. For example, it is inclined to 
present itself, in the tradition of Kant’s moral philosophy, as an a priori, unchangeable 
principle and not as a method. 
 The last point refers me to some attempts, mainly made in countries with illiberal 
regimes, to justify the political practices in their states. Some authors maintain that in 
countries like Russia, China and Turkey, the so called “civilizational identity” is preferable 
over liberal universalism. Weiwei Zhang (2012) and Christopher Coker (2019), for example, 




The latter supports the idea of strong nation and defends national isolation. Against these 
views, one is reminded of Kant’s discrimination between culture and civilization (AA8: 26). 
Culture is connected with moral progress (we already mentioned it in the lines above), 
civilization with formal politeness, manners and other niceties. Obviously, it is problematic to 
speak either of “culture” or of “civilization” in Kant’s sense when we speak about Putin’s 
Russia or Xi Jinping’s China. Their countries support neither culture nor civilization. 
 It is not difficult to discern the philosophical foundations of the idea of “civilization 
state”. Firstly, it is influenced by Hegel’s concept of state as an ontological entity, as a moral 
whole which is the ultimate objective of the world history. Secondly, it follows Heidegger’s 
concept of social identity as central to political theory. In support of this claim, I would refer 
to two Russian authors who defend Putin’s illiberal politics. Alexander Dugin (2014), for 
one, seeks to substantiate Russia’s anti-European, “Eurasian” future with Heidegger’s help. 
Vladislav Surkov, in contrast, defends Putin’s “long state” in a purely theoretical (not in 
geographical) terms. To be more explicit, he pleads for a hidden, “robust, absolutely 
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